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REFLECTIONS ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS
OF THE UNITED STATES:
The Debtor's Fresh Start
FRANK R. KENNEDY*
I. INTRODUCTION
A few years ago the Readers'Digest ran a story with the arrest-
ing title, "Planned )Bankruptcy: The Racket That Cheats Us All."
A subtitle explained: "Loopholes in our bankruptcy law enable
swindlers to fill their pockets-and rob consumers of millions of
dollars a day."' The opening gambit was a reference to an appli-
ance store owner in the midwest who, within six weeks of starting
business, "reached his unrespectable goal: bankruptcy." He testi-
fied that his appliances had been "stolen," his books "mislaid,"
and the bank deposits "gambled away." Since the story could not
be disproved, according to the Readers' Digest account, the owner
"had to be declared bankrupt, discharged from debts of $220,000
for items ordered from wholesalers, and compelled to surrender his
assets to creditors. His assets? A desk, a chair and six toasters."
Readers'Digest does not carry case citations, and the full story
cannot be checked. However, the lion's share of the inventory and
other assets probably was recovered by the distributors and finan-
cers who made it possible for the owner who started on credit.2 In
*A.B., Southwest Mo. State University, 1935; LL.B., Washington University,
1939; J.S.D., Yale University, 1953; Professor of Law, University of Michigan;
Executive Director of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States, 1971-73.
'READERS' DIGEST, May 1966, at 125. The author was Bill Surface. William
Surface is identified as an "American sports writer, columnist, and author" in 2
H. SHARP, HANDBOOK OF PSEUDONYMS AND PERSONAL NIcKNAz1ES 979 (1972).
2Security interests in inventory effective against the trustee in bankruptcy are
exceedingly easy for distributors and financiers to obtain. See, e.g., Coogan,
Operating Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code Without Help or
Hindrance of the "Floating Lien, " in 1 P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN & D. VAGTS, SECURED
TRANSACTIONS UNDER U.C.C. 782-809 (1963); Hogan, Future Goods, Floating Liens,
and Foolish Creditors, in 2 id. 1907-29 (1966).
1
Kennedy: Reflections on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States: The Debt
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1974
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
any event, the Bankruptcy Act would not prevent their recovering
their investment to the extent that it was secured by the collateral
furnished by them or bought with their money. I shall discuss in
the second lecture the question of how far such creditors should be
able to protect themselves against loss by security arrangements
and force other creditors-employees and suppliers of services and
consumable items-to absorb the brunt of the business failure.
The point I make now is that there is nothing in the Bankruptcy
Act that would keep the creditors from access to these assets.
Without saying what happened in the case described in his
opening paragraphs, the Readers' Digest author wrote that
"[s]uch deliberate bankruptcy is an alarming new nationwide
phenomenon."13 The story then went on to describe what are called
"scam" operations and "planned bankruptcies," with the implica-
tion that the Bankruptcy Act not only permits but countenances
such conduct. The point was then made that the creditors who lose
money as a result of planned bankruptcies of their customer debt-
ors must recoup these losses as costs passed on ultimately to con-
sumers who pay the final bill. There can be no contesting the
essential correctness of the point that credit losses are passed on
in one way or the other to those of us who pay the bills in our
economic and political system.
We all know that bad debt losses, like those resulting from
shoplifting and floods and fires, increase the cost of doing business.
But how do the bankruptcy laws. come in for blame? Because,
according to the Readers'Digest story: "Under the National Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1938, designed to protect innocent victims of finan-
cial reverses, anyone hopelessly indebted can legally dismiss liabil-
ities without being punished."'
I. NONPAYMENT OF DEBT AS AN OFFENSE
A. Punishment of Delinquent Debtors
The twin notions that the bankruptcy laws of the country were
designed only for persons who have been overwhelmed by indebt-
edness without fault and that persons who fail to pay their debts
ought to be punished have an ancient lineage and come from a
hardy stock. The Romans, under the laws of the Twelve Tables,
3Surface, Planned Bankruptcy: The Racket That Cheats Us All, READERS'
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allowed a creditor of a delinquent debtor to confine him in chains
of fifteen pounds in weight for sixty days at the creditor's house
but without any duty on the part of the creditor to feed him.5 After
subjection to certain public indignities, which may have been jus-
tified as guaranties of due process,' the delinquent debtor could be
put to death or sold in bondage beyond the Tiber. If two or more
creditors prosecuted their claims simultaneously against a debtor,
the body of the debtor could be divided among them "according
to the amount of their respective demands."'7 As Professor Jolowicz
has observed:
The frightful severity of this process of execution, which is
vouched for by the fragments of the Tables, shows clearly that
5W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW 618-19 (3d ed. 1963); H. JOLOWICZ,
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE ROMAN LAW 190-91 (2d ed. 1954); Washer,
Imprisonment for Debt, 7 GREEN BAG 410, 411 (1895).
'During the interlude between confinement in the creditor's house and disposi-
tion of the debtor's body, the debtor was conveyed to the marketplace before the
praetor, and his debts proclaimed for three consecutive days. If a vindex appeared
for him, he was liberated. This intervenor was a third person, who came forward,
attacked the claim and judgment as invalid, and agreed to pay double the amount
of the indebtedness if he should not prove it so. If no vindex presented himself, the
person of the debtor was restored to the custody of the creditor, who could dispose
of him as he pleased. Washer, supra note 5, at 411. See also W. BUCKLAND, supra
note 5; T. MACKENZIE, STUDIES IN ROMAN LAw 374-75 (5th ed. 1880).
7Washer, supra note 5, at 411. The author of the chapter on assignments for
the benefit of creditors and voluntary compositions (Seymour Lieberman of the
Houston, Texas, bar), in CREDrroRs' RIGHTS IN TEXAS (1963), introduces his subject
(at p. 115) by this quotation from the Twelve Tables, Table I1, 6 (c. 450 B.C.): "If
the debtor be insolvent to serve creditors, let his body be cut in pieces on the third
market day. It may be cut into more or fewer pieces with impunity. Or, if his
creditors, consent to it, let him be sold to foreigners beyond the Tiber."
Washer was so outraged by the reports that he was quoting (see supra notes 5
& 6 and accompanying text) that he added this impassioned paragraph:
If this account be true, the practice, for diabolicalness, finds no
parallel in the history of the world. Men have, in the insanity engendered
by intense religious enthusiasm, committed deeds of blood at which we
shudder, but the barbarity of their acts becomes insignificant when com-
pared to an an officer of justice, calmly and in the performance of the
duty imposed on him by the positive law of the land, condemning a man
to be quartered, and the reeking parts to be delivered to the Shylocks who
stood ready to receive their portion in return for a few pieces of silver.
Professors Buckland, Jolowicz, and Lord Mackenzie have noted that some
writers have thought that the relevant clause of the Laws of the Twelve Tables is
not to be taken literally but to mean that the property of the debtor or the proceeds
of the sale of the debtor as a slave was divided. W. BUCKLAND, supra note 5, at 620;
H. JOLOWICZ, supra note 5, at 192 n. 1; J. MACKENZIE, supra note 6, at 374. All these
writers refer to Roman authorities who knew of no instance of debtor dissection.
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the law of debt was still regarded as part of the law of delict;
the creditor who is not paid what is owed him has suffered a
wrong; he desires to take vengeance on his debtor and the law
permits him to have his way. The process described is, clearly,
merely a regulation of vengeance, of the primitive seizure of the
debtor by the creditor8
Largely because of the solicitude of the feudal law for preserv-
ing the availability of the lord's subjects for military and other
services, imprisonment and other sanctions against the body of the
debtor did not flourish in the Middle Ages. As feudalism declined,
however, imprisonment for debt was increasingly resorted to with
the blessings of the Church, "debt and insolvency being considered
sinful."'
Debtors were excommunicated; persons who died without leav-
ing sufficient estate to discharge their obligations were denied
Christian burial. In some regions the priest who absolved the
dying debtor became liable for the latter's debts. Many debtors
who escaped imprisonment were compelled to wear a distin-
guishing garb."0
The employment of arrest and imprisonment of debtors by
creditors seeking collection of their claims was greatly facilitated
in England by Parliamentary enactments in the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries, and by the time of Blackstone all common law
courts were allowing arrest and body execution routinely in civil
actions for collection of debts." Charles Dickens, whose father was
often heavily in debt-"partly by his misfortunes and partly by his
fault"-and often moved the family in Charles' early years to a
new address to escape creditors until he settled down in the Debt-
ors' Prison of the Marshalsea, 2 has enabled us to experience vicari-
9H. JOLOWicz, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 192 (2d ed. 1954). A
similar observation is made in the first chapter on "Early Forms of Liability" in
0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 14 (1938): "[T]he right to put to death looks like
vengeance, and the division of the body shows that the debt was conceived very
literally to inhere in or bind with a vinculum juris."
'Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 26 MICH. L. Rsv. 24, 25 (1926).
11Id. at 25-26.
"3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *281 et seq.; 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 231-32 (1926); Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 2 TEMP. L.Q. 330-50
(1928); Levy, Mesne Process in Personal Actions at Common Law and the Power
Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 52, 61-63 (1968); cf. Fox, Process of Imprisonment at Com-
mon Law, 39 L.Q. REV. 46 (1923).
12G.K. Chesterton, Charles John Huffam Dickens in 7 ENCYC. BRITANNICA 376
(1970). See also notes 66-67 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 76
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ously the poor debtor's misery in the merrie old England of the
nineteenth century. Like the distinction between law and equity,' "
imprisonment for debt has been on the way out in both England"
and the United States'- for the last one hundred fifty years, but
'3See C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 17-31 (2d ed. 1947); F. EVERSHED, ASPECTS OF
ENGLISH EQUITY 47-48 (1954); 1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.50[1] (2d ed.
1959).
"An Act of Parliament passed in 1869, 32 & 33 Vict., c. 62, abolished all arrest
on mesne process, and this was supposed to have done away with the capias writs
under which debtors were imprisoned. The English courts were authorized, how-
ever, to require any judgment debtor to pay an unsatisfied judgment in install-
ments, and if it was believed that the debtor had the means of paying during the
interval allowed for the payment of an installment, the debtor might be imprisoned
for up to six weeks. Subsequent defaults could be the basis for further imprison-
ment. Under this procedure thousands of consumer debtors have been imprisoned
every year. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT DEBTS,
CMD. No. 3709, at 249-50 (1969); Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25 MICH. L. REv.
24, 31 (1926).
A twelve-man committee, appointed in 1965 and chaired by Mr. Justice Payne,
came to a unanimous conclusion that committal to prison under the Debtors Act
of 1869 should be abolished but by a divided vote recommended retention of impris-
onment of defaulters on orders to provide maintenance of a wife and family. REPORT
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT DEBTS, CMD. No. 3709, at 246-
89 (1969). The committee summarized its reasons for abolition as follows:
The large majority of debtors received in prison are inadequate, un-
fortunate, reckless or irresponsible persons in need of help, not dishonest
or plausible debtors ....
The present judgment summons practice does not enable the
debtor's means and circumstances to be properly investigated before the
issue of or execution of a commital order ....
The defects in this procedure . . . are due not to the judges, regis-
trars and their staff but to the system itself ....
One cannot justify sending inadequate persons to prison in order to
extract money from the recalcitrant ....
Suppliers must be persuaded to enquire about the credit worthiness
of potential customers before concluding transactions with them ....
Id. at 261. For a wry comment on the rationale underlying the English law of 1869,
see T. ARNOLD, SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 204 (1935).
"About the year 1830 a wave of reform swept the country ...
In consequence of constitutional provisions and supplementary stat-
utes, imprisonment for debt is generally abolished in contract cases.
There is a great variation in the practice of the various states in tort and
fraudulent contract cases. . . . Constitutional provisions against impris-
onment ,for debt are usually construed as applying to the common law
writs of capias ad respondendum and capias ad satisfaciendum, but not
to equity and admiralty process.
Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25 MICH. L. REv. 24, 29, 33-34 (1926).
According to Comment, 80 YALE L.J. 1679 (1971), "Imprisonment for debt as
a method of enforcing commercial obligations is now banned in every state," and
5
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correspondence received by the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws
of the United States suggests that the attitudes that animated the
builders of debtors' prisons still survive. That, indeed, imprison-
ment for debt is not a matter of concern only to historians is evi-
denced by an examination of current legal literature.'"
B. Fault as a Bar to Bankruptcy Relief of the Debtor
Correspondence received by the Commission sometimes
stated or assumed as a fundamental premise of bankruptcy laws
that benefits should be available only to a debtor victimized by
misfortune for which he was in no way accountable or, in any
event, benefits should be denied to a debtor found to be blamewor-
thy. There are interesting though elusive antecedents for this view
that still survive in some quarters.
The origins of bankruptcy can be traced to the Roman pro-
cesses, missio in bona and cessio bonorum.'7 The latter was in the
nature of a voluntary composition effected by a debtor with his
creditors but required judicial authorization,' 8 and it may have
been available only to a debtor whose insolvency was not due to
his own fault.'" By opting for this course the debtor obtained an
immunity from arrest and imprisonment, escaped the badge of
infamy, and was allowed to retain so much of his after-acquired
property as was necessary for his subsistence." The corollary is
relevant constitutional and statutory provisions are cited. 80 YALE L.J. at 1679 n.
1. The Supreme Court has not found imprisonment for debt forbidden by the
Constitution of the United States. Cf. Gotthill v. Sills, 375 U.S. 79 (1963) (certiorari
to review order authorizing body execution held to have been improvidently
granted). See Carter v. Lynch, 429 F.2d 154, 157-58 (4th Cir. 1970), for a recent
instance of an unsuccessful challenge to imprisonment for nonpayment of a civil
judgment. The case is criticized in 24 VAND. L. REV. 621 (1971).
"See, e.g., Alderman, Imprisonment for Debt: Default Judgments, the Con.
tempt Power & the Effectiveness of Notice Provisions in the State of New York, 24
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1217 (1973); Rogge, Treatment of Debtors, 22 BUFF. L. REv. 45,
49-55 (1972); Comment, Imprisonment for Debt & the Constitution, 1970 LAW &
Soc. ORDER 659; Note, Imprisonment for Debt in 1969,4 N. ENG. L. REv. 227 (1969);
Comment, Imprisonment for Debt: In the Military Tradition, 80 YALE L.J. 1679
(1971); Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 1324 (1973).
iS. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 386 (1967).
"Id.
1W. BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 645 n.2 (3d ed. 1963); H. JOLOWICZ,
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 226 (1954). Professor Jolowicz also sur-
mises that cessio bonorum was not available in no-asset and nominal-asset cases.
21BUcKLAND, supra note 19; Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law,
66 U. PA. L. REV. 223-26, 235-36 (1918).
[Vol. 76
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that if the debtor thereafter acquired enough wealth to pay his
debts in full, he remained liable therefor."' Missio in bona, on the
other hand, accorded the debtor no immunity from imprisonment
or from infamy,2" though apparently the debtor was protected
against seizure for one year.?
Bankruptcy experienced a revival among the Italian cities
during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but one of its dis-
tinctive characteristics was stigmatization of the bankrupt. 4 Pro-
fessor Riesenfeld reports that Scotland, which drew more heavily
than did England on the civil law of the continent, imported the
European practice of compelling a bankrupt to wear degrading
apparel." It is nevertheless generally acknowledged that the bank-
ruptcy laws of England, the first of which was enacted in 1543,26
were strongly influenced by the precursor institution as it had
developed in Italy and spread through France, Spain, and other
European countries. 2 Lord Coke observed: "We have fetched as
well the name as the wickedness of bankruptcy from foreign na-
tions."1
The first English act recited that "divers and sundry persons,
craftily obtaining into their hands great substance of other men's
goods, do suddenly flee to parts unknown, or keep their houses, not
minding to pay or restore to any their creditors, their debts and
duties." 1 It accordingly authorized seizure of the property of such
persons, their, imprisonment, and distribution of their property
among creditors. In 1670-71, Parliament passed an act to enable
an imprisoned debtor to be discharged if it appeared that he had
no estate exceeding ten pounds and that he had not conveyed away
his estate to defraud his creditors."8 The discharge from prison did
not, however, discharge his debts."' Professor Holdsworth has re-
ferred to the failure to differentiate between the unfortunate and
2 BUCKLAND, supra note 19.
2Id., T. MACKENZIE, STUDIES IN RomAN LAW 376 n.1 (5th ed. 1880).
21BUCKLAND, supra note 19.
21RIESENFELD, supra note 17; Levinthal, supra note 20, at 243-44.
zRiesenfeld, The Evolution of Modern Bankruptcy Law, 31 MINN. L. REV. 401,
441 n.308b (1947).
2134 & 35 Henry VIII, c. 4.
n8 W. HoLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 230-33 (1926); RIESENFELD, supra
note 17, at 386-87.
214 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND ch. 63, at 277 (1797).
"34 & 35 Henry VIII, c. 4, as quoted in HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 236.
1122 & 23 Charles II, c. 20.
71
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 235.
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the dishonest or reckless bankrupt as a great defect of this early
bankruptcy legislation:
The governing idea of the statutes was that the bankrupt is an
offender; and the fact that they provided for no discharge from
his liabilities, as the result of bankruptcy proceedings, is char-
acteristic of this governing idea. The result was that the rogue
often escaped while "plain dealing men were laid hold of."'
For all the harshness of the English law, Roger Sherman of
Connecticut seems to have overreacted when he cast his vote in the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 against the proposal to grant
Congress the power "to establish uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcy" because "[b]ankruptcies were in some cases punish-
able with death by the laws of England and he did not choose to
grant a power by which that might be done here."" Nor is there
evidence of any inclination on the part of the colonial legislatures
to adopt such harsh sanctions against bankrupts in their enact-
ments patterned on the English laws. They did sometimes regard
absence from fault as a prerequisite to bankruptcy as a mode of
relief from imprisonment for debt. Thus, Professor William Cross-
key, in a summary of the state legislation antedating the Federal
Constitutional Convention of 1787, discussed a general "Act for the
Regulation of Bankruptcy" adopted in Pennsylvania in 1785,
which provided for a discharge of "such honest debtors as in the
course of trade and dealing ha[d] without any fault or crime
become bankrupt."34 The same Act also extended relief from im-
prisonment to any debtor on surrender of all his property for the
payment of his debts.
I. DISCHARGE
A. A Carrot for the Cooperative Debtor
Although discharge from indebtedness has become the pre-
eminent purpose of bankruptcy in this country," as we shall see,
it was not provided by the English bankuptcy laws until 1705.0
32 d. at 243.
332 M. FARRAND, THE RECORD OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 489 (1937).
311 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 489 (1953), citing 12 PA. STAT.
AT LARGE 70.
"[So prominent a feature did it become that in this country ... the test
of a bankruptcy law is that it contains a provision for the discharge of debts." G.
GLENN, LIQUIDATION 484 (1935). See also RIESENFELD, supra note 17, at 354, 390, 593.
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Moreover, it appears not to be a feature of the bankruptcy laws of
continental Europe. 7 The Supreme Court recently recognized that
the original purpose of the discharge provisions of English law was
to reward cooperating debtors, 38 in particular. Along with the stick
provided by criminal sanctions against fraud and concealment, the
discharge was viewed as a carrot to encourage complete and
prompt surrender of the debtor's assets. 39 If, as a Harvard Law
Review article argued seventy years ago, "the true functions of
bankruptcy are administration and distribution" for the benefit of
creditors," the discharge feature in our bankruptcy laws has served
at least an ancillary role in achieving the objective of full and
equitable distribution. In view of trends in the volume and charac-
ter of bankruptcies in this country, however, this role has a dimin-
ishing significance.
The most obvious and dramatic fact about bankruptcy in the
United States during the last twenty-five years and the fact of
most significance in the genesis and growth of the movement to
create a commission to study the bankruptcy laws is the increase
of petitions filed by nonbusiness debtors from a nadir of 8,566 in
fiscal 1946 to a peak of 191,729 in fiscal 1967.1' Throughout this
period the percentage of cases in which there are no dividends
distributed to creditors-the no-asset and nominal-asset
cases-has remained fairly stable at about eighty-five percent of
all bankruptcies.42 Yet, in over ninety-five percent of the cases of
31RIESENFELD, supra note 35, at 387.
"'United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 447 (1973), quoting and citing J.
MAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPrcY 20-21, 88 (1956).
"Although the penalty for failure of bankrupts to surrender themselves and
their property was made a felony without benefit of clergy, the reward of discharge
and a small allowance from the estate to the cooperative bankrupt was added by
the Statute of 4 Anne, c. 17 (1706) to supplement the threat posed by the penal
provisions. See S. WILLISTON, CASES ON BANKRUPTCY 2 (2d ed. 1915).
'"Olmstead, Bankruptcy as a Commercial Regulation, 15 HARv. L. REV. 829,834
(1902).
"Judge Edward Weinfeld, as Chairman of the Committee on Bankruptcy Ad-
ministration of the Judicial Conference of the United States, provided data com-
piled by the Administrative Office of the United States regarding bankruptcy fil-
ings at the first hearings on the bill to create the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws
of the United States. The figures cited in the text appear in Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Bankruptcy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 60 (1968). Data on bankruptcy filings are published annually by the Director
of the Administrative Office.
'2D. STANLEY, M. GIRTH, et al., BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 20 (
1971 Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.).
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individual debtors discharge is granted. 3 Witnesses at the congres-
sional hearings on the bills to create the Commission on Bank-
ruptcy Laws and correspondents writing letters to the Commission
darkly suggested that the escalation of consumer bankruptcies
posed a threat for the nation's economy, social structure, and
moral fiber.4 The Commission called in a group of economists with
special competence in the field of credit to get expert advice as to
the seriousness of the threat presented by the annual statistics to
the operation of the bankruptcy system. 5 They confirmed the cor-
rectness of the conclusions that had been reached by a Brookings
Institution task force and that were subsequently published in
December of 1971.46 The Brookings report's statement bears re-
peating here:
A willingness to seek and extend credit is essential to the
smooth functioning of the U.S. economy, whose institutional
structure efficiently accumulates the nation's savings and chan-
nels them into the hands of borrowers. In the process, situations
inevitably arise in which the borrower is unable or unwilling to
repay. Indeed, the absence of credit losses would be an indica-
tion of economic inefficiency, since it would suggest that the
marketplace was not being allowed to work and that lenders
were withholding funds from marginal borrowers as a class,
even though such borrowers would be willing and able to pay
interest rates sufficient to cover losses on bad debts.
Total private debt has grown rapidly in the last two de-
cades but there is little empirical evidence that the debt burden
is too great for borrowers as a whole. Unless there is a downturn
in economic activity considerably worse than anything the
United States has experienced in almost thirty years-a possi-
bility that most economists think unlikely-the existing and
expected debt level is not alarming.
"V. COUNTRYMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 327-28 (1964)
("Bankrupts receive discharges in 95 per cent of the cases-in 80 per cent of the
asset cases and in 90 per cent of the cases in which nothing is available for credi-
tors").
"Hearings on S. J. Res. 100 Before the Subcomm. on Bankruptcy of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Sen.
Hearings); Hearings on S. J. Res. 88 and H.R. 6665 and H.R. 12250 Before Sub-
comm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 43 (1968)
(hereinafter cited as House Hearings).
"REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES pt. 1,
at xiii (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT].
I'D. STANLEY, M. GIRTH, et al., BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 39-40
(01971 Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.).
[Vol. 76
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Some $2 billion of debts were discharged in the bankuptcy
courts in 1968-about .2 per cent of the private debt outstand-
ing-a cost that is widely diffused throughout the economy,
being borne partly by borrowers as a whole, through higher
interest rates, but principally by customers of business borrow-
ers, through higher prices.
Business bankruptcy rates have been relatively stable for
the past decade. Personal bankruptcies, however, have sharply
increased in number since World War II, though at a diminish-
ing rate, and actually decreased in 1968 and 1969. The growth
apparently resulted primarily from the increase in the amount
of indebtedness of the population rather than from deteriorat-
ing credit standards or a greater willingness of persons to enter
bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy, then, is not so much a problem to the Ameri-
can economy as it is a human problem, and a problem in court
procedure and in government administration . . ..
The Commission on Bankruptcy Laws came to the same conclu-
sion, and its recommendations reflect this orientation.
Witnesses at the congressional hearings on the bill to create
the Commission and correspondents writing the Commission fre-
quently made the entirely plausible point that the sponsors of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 could not have contemplated that the Act
would be so extensively used by consumer debtors and that so large
a portion of the cases would involve no assets or only nominal
assets." The point does not, however, prove the conclusion fre-
quently attached to it, viz., that the Act should be amended to cut
down access by consumer debtors to relief under the Act. In par-
ticular, the Commission heard or received arguments renewing
a proposal made by the American Bar Association's Consumer
Bankruptcy Committee in the 1960s that a wage earner should not
be granted a discharge unless the referee found that the debtor
could not obtain adequate relief under Chapter XIII by proposing
a plan for payment of his debts out of future earnings.49 The
Committee's proposal for what was generally denominated a
compulsory Chapter XIII was supported by the American Bar
"Id.
"Sen. Hearings, supra note 44, at 5, 47, 48, 91; House Hearings, supra note 44,
at 43, 85.
"The proposal was embodied in H.R. 1057 and H.R. 5771, introduced into the
First Session of the 90th Congress.
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Association, the American Bankers Association, and creditor-
oriented spokesmen ", and opposed by labor unions, the National
Bankruptcy Conference, and the Judicial Conference of the United
States.)' The Judicial Conference and other opponents thought it
made an invidious distinction between wage earners and business-
men whose access to relief by way of discharge would remain unim-
paired by the proposal.2 Moreover, the opponents were convinced
that no wage earner plan stood much chance of successful perform-
ance if the debtor was forced to accept it.' ' Presumably convinced
by the opponents' arguments, the House Committee on the Judici-
ary did not report out the bill for a compulsory Chapter XIII, and
no bill proposing such a measure has been introduced since 1967.
B. Discharge as Salvation for the Debtor
The foregoing account of the origin of the discharge of the
debtor in bankruptcy falls considerably short of explaining how it
has come to its present importance as a means of extricating debt-
ors from financial distress. Since there has been no parallel devel-
opment in other countries, the tracing of its evolution requires
resort primarily to American sources.
Daniel Webster, himself no stranger to financial stringency,'
supported enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1840 with this word
picture of the need for debtor relief:
There are probably one or two hundred thousand debtors,
honest, sober, and industrious, who drag out lives useless to
themselves, useless to their families, and useless to their coun-
try, for no reason but that they cannot be legally discharged
from debts in which misfortunes have involved them, and which
there is no possibility of their ever paying. I repeat, again, that
these cases have now been accumulating for a whole genera-
tion.55
It is true they are not imprisoned; 5 but there may be, and
"Hearings on H.R. 1057 and H.R. 5771 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-44, 112-14, 121-34, 136-37 (1967).
5Id. at 9-11, 45-112, 115-21, 134-35.
"Id. at 9, 22-23, 47, 74, 105.
1Id. at 10, 50.
1123 ENcyc. BRITANNICA 470, 471-72 (1954).
" The first National Bankruptcy Act, enacted in 1800, 2 Stat. 19, had been
repealed on December 19, 1803, 37 years before Webster's speech, by 2 Stat. 248.
"Webster later in this speech alluded to the progress of the previous ten years
"on another connected subject; I mean the abolition of imprisonment for debt."
(Vol. 76
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there are, restraint and bondage outside the walls of the jail, as
well as in. Their power of earning is, in truth, taken away; their
faculty of useful employment is paralyzed, and hope itself be-
comes extinguished. Creditors, generally, are not inhuman or
unkind; but here will be found some who hold on, and the more
a debtor struggles to free himself, the more they feel encouraged
to hold on. The mode of reasoning is, that, the more honest the
debtor may be, the more industrious, the more disposed to
struggle and bear up against his misfortunes, the greater the
chance is, that, in the end, especially if the humanity of others
shall have .led them to release him, their own debts may be
finally recovered.
. . . Many of these insolvent persons are young men with
young families." Like other men, they have capacities both for
action and enjoyment. Are we to stifle all these for ever? Are we
to suffer all these persons, many of them meritorious and re-
spectable, to be pressed to the earth for ever, by a load of hope-
less debt? . . . The insolvent persons have not the power of
locomotion. They cannot travel from State to State. They are
prisoners. To my certain knowledge, there are many who cannot
even come here to the seat of government to present their pe-
titions to Congress, so great is their fear that some creditor will
dog their heels, and arrest them in some intervening State, or
in this District, in the hope that friends will appear to save
them, by payment of the debt, from imprisonment. These are
truths; not creditable to the country, but they are truths. I am
sorry for their existence. Sir, there is one crime, quite too com-
mon, which the laws of man do not punish but which cannot
escape the justice of God; and that is, the arrest and confine-
ment of a debtor by his creditor, with no motive on earth but
the hope that some friend, or some relative, perhaps almost as
poor as himself, his mother as it may be, or his sisters, or his
daughters, will give up all their own little pittance, and make
beggars of themselves, to save him from the horrors of a loath-
some jail. Human retribution cannot reach this guilt; human
feeling may not penetrate the flinty heart that perpetrates it;
51The Brookings Institution's team of investigators studied four hundred debt-
ors chosen at random from files of bankruptcy cases closed in fiscal year 1964 and
interviewed two years later. Over half were still under forty years of age, and 76%
were married. D. STANLEY, M. GIRTH, et al., BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS,
REFORM 41-42 (d,1971 Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.). Other studies
examined by the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws indicated that "the ages of
nonbusiness debtors in cases under the Act tend to cluster in the late 20's and early
to mid 30's," with "mean ages ranging from 30 years to slightly over 34 years."
COMMISSION REPORT, pt. I, at 42.
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but an hour is surely coming, with more than human retribu-
tion on its wings, when that flint shall be melted, either by the
power of penitence and grace, or in the fires of remorse. 8
It is bad to the public and to the country, which loses the
effort and the industry of so many useful and capable citizens.
It is bad to creditors, because there is no security against prefer-
ences, no principle of equality, and no encouragement for hon-
est, fair, and seasonable assignments of effects. As to the
debtor, however good his intentions or earnest his endeavors, it
subdues his spirit, and degrades him in his own esteem; and if
he attempts any thing for the purpose of obtaining food and
clothing for his family, he is driven to unworthy shifts and dis-
guises, to the use of other persons' names, to the adoption of the
character of agent, and various other contrivances, to keep the
little earnings of the day from the reach of his creditors. Fathers
"Arrest and confinement for such unworthy and ulterior purposes occur less
often nearly 150 years later, but the flinty hearts beat on. Twenty-five years ago
the United States Supreme Court, in Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1948), dealt with
a fairly common phenomenon in bankruptcy, the turnover order directed against a
bankrupt or an officer of a bankrupt company who could not comply and who
therefore had to be punished for his disobedience of the court's order. In the opinion
of the court being reviewed, Judge Jerome Frank had said, "[a]lthough we know
that Maggio cannot comply with the order, we must keep a straight face and
pretend that he can, and must thus affirm orders which direct Maggio 'to do an
impossibility, and then punish him for refusal to perform it.' "In re Luma Camera
Service, Inc., 157 F.2d 951, 955 (2d Cir. 1946). The reason for this blatant stultifica-
tion of the legal process was that Maggio was proven to have taken possession or
control of a bankrupt corporation's assets several months before the bankruptcy
and, in the absence of a credible explanation by him of what happened to them,
he was presumed by a rule of law declared and enforced by the courts in the Second
Circuit to have continued in possession of the assets or their proceeds. The Supreme
Court found a way of letting the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit off the
hook on which it had impaled itself so that poor Joe Maggio could get out of jail
before rotting there. Mr. Justice Jackson felt obliged to observe in passing: "It
should not be necessary to say that it would be a flagrant abuse of process to issue
such an order to exert pressure on friends and relatives to ransom the accused party
from being jailed." 333 U.S. at 64. One occasionally reads and hears laments about
the difficulty of collecting bankrupt estates since the Supreme Court decision in
Maggio v. Zeitz.
The quotation from Webster also brings to mind a report received by the staff
of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws that some credit unions require borrowers
to furnish a cosigner for every $100 lent. Under such circumstances a discharge or
even a wage earner plan confirmed for such a debtor is unlikely to give him and
his family any relief from the irresistible pressure to take care of the debt to the
credit union. The Commission proposed that during the term of any plan of pay-
ment confirmed for a debtor with regular income pursuant to Chapter VI of the
Proposed Act, creditors should be enjoined from pursuing their remedies against
sureties. CoMMissioN REPORT, pt. I, at 167; id., pt. I, § 6-208.
[Vol. 76
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act in the name of their sons, sons act in the name of their
fathers; all constantly exposed to the greatest temptation to
misrepresent facts and to evade the law, if creditors should
strike. All this is evil, unmixed evil. And what is it all for? Of
what benefit to anybody? Who likes it? Who wishes it? What
class of creditors desires it? What consideration of public good
demands it?"9
Daniel Webster's oratory, with support from such distin-
guished statesmen as Henry Clay of Kentucky and John Quincy
Adams and Rufus Choate of Massachusetts, was instrumental in
persuading Congress to enact the Bankruptcy Act of 1841.60 Theo-
philus Parsons was to say in 1857 that although the law was re-
pealed one year, six months, and fourteen days after it was en-
acted,
it affected more property, and gave rise to more numerous and
more difficult questions, than any other law has ever done, in
the same period. It was repealed because it had done its work.
The people demanded it, that it might settle claims and remove
encumbrances and liens and sweep away an indebtedness that
lay an intolerable burden on the community."
While the philosophy that a distressed debtor should be af-
forded relief by way of a discharge in bankruptcy seems to have
flourished only in this country, it is to be remembered that the
English law introduced the discharge, albeit for another reason, in
1705.62 We have earlier noted that imprisonment for debt has been
undergoing a contemporaneous process of decline on both sides of
the Atlantic for more than a century. 3 This phenomenon of paral-
lel developments was observed and eloquently described in 1888 in
a paper I once serendipitously discovered in the Reports of the
American Bar Association. The paper was delivered as an address
by Mr. J.M. Woolworth, an Omaha lawyer, to the meeting of the
"Speech of May 18, 1840, reprinted in SPEECHES AND ORATIONS OF DANImL
WEBSTER 471 et seq. (Whipple ed. 1879), and under the title The Fault Is Not in
the Constitution, in THE GOLDEN AGE OF AmEucAN LAW 373,377-79 (Haar ed. 1965).
"C. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 67-68, 70-72, 79-80 (1935);
Olmstead, Bankruptcy a Commercial Regulation, 15 HARV. L. REv. 829, 838-39
(1902). For further references to the role of Daniel Webster in connection with the
Act of 1841, see J. MAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 22-23 n.9 (1956).
"THE LAWS OF BUSINESS FOR BUSINESS MEN 235 (1857), reprinted in THE GOLDEN
AGE OF AMERIcAN LAW 380-81 (Haar ed. 1965).
"2See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
"See notes 14 & 15 supra and accompanying text
15
Kennedy: Reflections on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States: The Debt
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1974
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Association at Saratoga Springs, New York, and its subject was
"Jurisprudence Considered as a Branch of the Social Science."' ,
Now mark how the law in a single one of its branches, that
for instance of debtor and creditor, corresponded with the
character of Englishmen of the 17th Century. In the land
whose boast it was that the moment the slave planted his foot
upon its soil he became free, the body of the debtor was the
property of the creditor; not to be sure, as it was in old Rome,
where the usurer held in his hand the life of his victim, but
hardly less so, when imprisonment was the penalty of unpaid
debt. Poor debtors were confined with the vilest of criminals,
loaded with irons and racked with tortures. Covered with filth
and vermin they were left to die without pity, of cold, hunger,
and jail fever. We read with horror of a woman dying in Devon
County jail after an imprisonment of forty-five years for a debt
of £ 19. But the parallel between the public morals and the law
of debtor and creditor does not end here. Shortly after the be-
ginning of this century English character began a radical re-
form. The renovation of morals has been growing and spreading
and penetrating and dominating the social life of England, until
today to get drunk, to gamble, to fight, to be debauched is to
be ill-bred; which is the highest offence known to society. And
with this improved morality has come also a charity, a kind-
ness, a pity and sympathy for misfortune, until benevolence has
assumed the guardianship, not of the poor and sick only, but
of the vicious and criminal as well.
Note now the correspondence in the law of debtors. In 1813
insolvents were placed under the jurisdiction of a court, and
upon rendering a true account of their property were entitled to
seek their discharge. 6 This was the period of Dickens' Marshal-
I11 A.B.A. REP. 21, 279-300 (1888).
"In a previous passage, Mr. Woolworth had described that character in the
following terms:
In the eighteenth century, English character was brutal. Dissolute-
ness, extravagance and debauchery were general and excessive. In drink-
ing, oceans were drained; in gambling, colossal fortunes were staked and
lost; in dueling, the dearest lives were sacrificed; in pugilism, the best
men were maimed. From society, decency had fled; from commerce, hon-
esty; from the Church, piety; from the heart, charity; from literature,
chastity. With what exquisite sarcasm Thackeray pictured this in the
first chapters of the Virginians. In his article on Chatham, Macaulay has
told us what was the political morality of those days.
Id. at 293-94.
"Mr. Woolworth refers here to 53 George 3, c. 102. Professor Holdsworth says
that the court created by this act, situated in Portugal Street, Lincoln's Inn Fields,
(Vol. 76
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sea and Little Dorrit. Thirteen years later the law provided that
any one should be released upon surrendering all his goods." In
1861 the imprisonment of common debtors was altogether repu-
diated, and the old building was condemned to destruction. s In
our country the parallel runs further. Sympathy for distress,
charity for the fallen, have been nowhere else so active, efficient
and pervading as in America. Debts have almost lost their obli-
gation: misfortune exempts the debtor in the public estimation.
Laws have intervened for his protection: the homestead and
exemption statutes, in violent contrast to the Common Law,
attest the higher, purer, more beneficent morality of our day
and people."
It thus appears that the wellsprings for the movements of the last
century toward abolition of imprisonment for debt and the estab-
lishment of exemptions from creditor processes contributed to the
development of discharge from debt as a value independent of the
leverage it provided for encouraging debtor cooperation. It is plau-
sible to believe that this process was not dissociated from the hu-
manitarian impulses that animated the support for such causes as
the abolition of slavery and prison and hospital reform.
Needless to say the tendency in the bankruptcy law was de-
plored by some observers. When the question of whether to retain
or repeal the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was being debated in 1902 in
Congress and in the press, James Monroe Olmstead of the Boston
bar wrote in the Harvard Law Review that in a predominantly
commercial nation like the United States a bankruptcy law was
absolutely indispensable.70 But he could not refrain from adding
these animadversions of its character as a debtor relief measure:
In America, unfortunately, bankruptcy has come to be re-
garded as a sort of poor-debtor law, as a species of clearing
house for the liquidation of debt, or, as some have expressed it,
a "Hebrew Jubilee" whereby the people at intermittent periods
receive emancipation from their debts, are rehabilitated, and
is the one described so vividly by Dickens in Pickwick Papers. 11 W. HOLDSWORTH,
HISTORY OF ENGuSH LAW 598 (1938).
677 George 4, c. 57.
"Mr. Woolworth must have intended reference here to the Debtors Act of 1869,
which, however, as pointed out in note 14 supra, has failed to eliminate imprison-
ment for debt in England.
"11 A.B.A. REP. 279, 294-95 (1888).
"°Olmstead, supra note 60, at 829. Mr. Olmstead's article was duly cited by
Congressman Powers of Massachusetts in a speech to the House of Representatives,
June 17, 1902. 35 CONG. REc. 459.
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the "dead wood" of the community is thereby eliminated. That
the rehabilitation theory was farthest from the minds of the
Constitution, it has heretofore been attempted to be shown. 71
The showing consisted of snatches from the records of the Consti-
tutional Convention and'the Federalist Papers evidencing simply
a concern by the founding fathers with the need for uniformity of
the bankruptcy laws and the connection of bankruptcy laws with
commercial regulations in general.
Hostility to bankruptcy laws including provisions for dis-
charge has frequently been attributed to agrarian interests.72 And
it was curious how often witnesses speaking at the hearings con-
ducted by the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws referred to the
persistence of the Puritan ethic and rejection of the legitimacy of
a discharge in bankruptcy among the people of the midwest. 3 Per-
haps this "midwestern" attitude is illustrated by the brief that
appeared in the case of Bever v. Swecker, decided by the Su-
preme Court of Iowa in 1908, in which the counsel for the defen-
dant was arguing that his client's liability for conversion of the
plaintiffs cattle had been discharged in bankruptcy. His brief said
in part:
We are not especially struck with the bankrupt law, but it
is the law of the sovereign legislature of the U.S., and, as such,
parties taking advantage of its benefits are entitled to just such
benefits as it offers.
The year of Jubilee of the old Jews came once in 50 years
and lasted just one year, and during its existence there was
always a spontaneous "outburst" and era of good feeling, be-
cause everybody was square with everybody else. We are more
humane and have continued this blessed year since July 18th,
"Id. at 834-35.
721 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 8 (14th ed. 1974); C. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY 15-16, 21, 32-34, 42-43, 136-37 (1935).
"See, e.g., Transcript of Public Hearing Before the Commission on Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States, Los Angeles, Calif., May 12-13, 1972, at 159, 209, 234.
The transcript is filed with the National Archives. See COMMISSION REPORT, pt. I,
at xviii. The Commission undertook no systematic study of the correspondence it
received, but a substantial portion of the letters stressing the theme that bank-
ruptcy affords too easy access to discharge came from the midwest.
For a disquisition on the moral and ethical aspects of nonpayment of debt and
discharge in bankruptcy, see Shuchman, An Attempt at a "Philosophy of Bank-
ruptcy, " 21 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 403, especially 428-41, 449-58 (1973).
"1138 Iowa 721, 116 N.W. 704 (1908).
[Vol. 76
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1898, and like the book, it still continues to flow and go on25
The Iowa Supreme Court eased the conscience of counsel by hold-
ing that the liability was not discharged under the predecessor of
section 17a(2) of the present Act and section 4-506(a)(7) of the
proposed Act.
IV. THE EXPLICATION AND IMPLICATIONS oF THE FRESH START POLICY
The classic statement of the "fresh start" policy of the bank-
ruptcy laws was made by Mr. Justice George Sutherland, one of
the most conservative justices of the conservative Supreme Court
of the early 1930s. He spoke for a unanimous Court in striking
down the Illinois case law that allowed the enforcement of a wage
assignment securing a discharged debt. Decided forty years ago,
the case is Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,7 and it includes the following
passages:
One of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to
"relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebt-
edness, and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations
and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes."
Williams v. U.S. Fidelity & G. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-555. This
purpose of the act has been again and again emphasized by the
courts as being of public as well as private interest in that it
gives the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for dis-
tribution the property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy
a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-
existing debt. . . . The various provisions of the bankruptcy
act were adopted in the light of that view and are to be con-
strued when reasonably possible in harmony with it so as to
effectuate the general purpose and policy of the act.
. . .The power of the individual to earn a living for himself
and those dependent upon him is in the nature of a personal
liberty quite as much if not more than it is a property right. To
preserve its free exercise is of the utmost importance, not only
because it is a fundamental private necessity, but because it is
a matter of great public concern. From the viewpoint of the
wage earner there is little difference between not earning at all
and earning wholly for a creditor. Pauperism may be the neces-
sary result of either. . . . The new opportunity in life and the
7The brief is bound and filed in the library of the University of Iowa College
of Law.
71292 U.S. 234 (1934).
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clear field for future effort, which is the purpose of the bank-
ruptcy act to afford the emancipated debtor, would be of little
value to the wage earner if he were obliged to face the necessity
of devoting the whole or a considerable portion of his earnings
for an indefinite time in the future to the payment of indebted-
ness incurred prior to his bankruptcy."
The role of the fresh start policy has primarily been one of
providing the rationale and thrust for extending increasing
protection of the debtor's right to a discharge in bankruptcy. It
underlies the considerable expansion of the jurisdiction of courts
of bankruptcy by the congressional amendments of the Bank-
ruptcy Act in 1970 to prevent the persistent frustration of the
discharge by creditors' litigation in state courts.7" It is exemplified
by the recent Supreme Court decision in Perez v. Campbell,"
which overruled two earlier opinions on the issue0 of whether revo-
cation of a driver's license for failure to pay an automobile accident
judgment conflicts with the discharge provisions of the Act. The
recommendations of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws respect-
ing discharge provisions have been attacked as carrying the impli-
cations of the fresh start policy to unacceptable limits.8 '
The fresh start policy has also been influential in the construc-
tion of other provisions of the Act. Thus, it has been relied on as
77Id. at 244-45.
1184 Stat. 990, amending §§ 2, 14, 15, 17, 38, and 58 of the Act. See Country-
man, The New Dischargeability Law, 45 AM. B.L.J. 1 (1971). Although rules of
procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to congressional enabling
acts are not supposed to implement substantive policies, the rules should be com-
patible with, and conducive to the fulfillment of, the policies adopted by the Con-
gress and the courts. Bankruptcy Rules 401, 404, and 409 should contribute in this
way to the effectuation of the fresh start policy that has evolved through legislative
and judicial processes.
7'402 U.S. 637 (1971).
"Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962); Reitz v. Mealey,
314 U.S. 33 (1941).
"'Apparently losing sight of or ignoring one of the primary purposes
of bankruptcy in the United States-to relieve the "honest" but unfor-
tunate debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness-the Commis-
sion on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States released its report on
July 30, 1973, recommending that the Bankruptcy Act be completely
revamped along different lines so as to provide relief for debtors whether
honest or not. In its debtor oriented approach, the Commission proposed
a new and sweeping "fresh start" policy which substantially infringes
upon the present rights of creditors.
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support for a broad construction of the provisions defining prova-
ble claims. 2 Most recently, it appears to have been of crucial sig-
nificance in construing section 70a, which defines the property of
the bankrupt estate.
The Supreme Court has this term granted certiorari to con-
sider a disputed implication of the fresh start doctrine. 3 The ques-
tion is whether the fresh start policy warrants the retention by the
bankrupt of an income tax refund representing excessive withhold-
ing from his prebankruptcy income pursuant to the formula pre-
scribed by the Internal Revenue Service. Three federal appellate
courts have ruled on the question and have disagreed. In In re
Cedor, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court
ruling that the tax refund belonged to the bankrupt rather than the
trustee in bankruptcy," and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, in In re Gehrig, has rendered a decision in accord.85 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has disagreed in In re
2See, e.g., Maynard v. Elliott, 283 U.S. 273 (1931), holding an indorser's liabil-
ity provable (and therefore dischargeable); Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Audito-
rium Ass'n, 240 U.S. 581 (1916), which held an installment contract for commercial
services to have been broken anticipatorily by the bankruptcy of the person obli-
gated to render the service. The result in the last cited case was to give the other
party a claim for damages for the anticipatory breach but more importantly to free
the bankrupt from the burden of the financial entanglement represented by the
service contract. See J. MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCy 126, 173 (1956). The Chicago
Auditorium case, however, seems incompatible with the explicit recognition by
section 70b of the Act of the trustee's right to assume an executory contract. See
V. COUNTRYMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 437-39 (1964);
Broude, Executory Contracts and Bankruptcy: The Case for a Federal Common
Law, 17 KAN. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1968); Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bank-
ruptcy Cases (pt. 1), 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 407, 413-20 (1972). The case would be
overruled by section 4-602(b) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1973, proposed by the
Commission on Bankruptcy Laws. COMMISSION REPORT, pt. 11, at 156.
"Kokoszka v. Belford, 94 S. Ct. 721 (1973).
94470 F.2d 996 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 973 (1973). The opinion of the court
of appeals was a per curiam affirmance of the district court opinion, 337 F. Supp.
1103 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See also In re Kingswood, 470 F.2d 996, rev'g 343 F. Supp.
498 (9th Cir. 1972). Cedor is approved by Countryman, The Use of State Law in
Bankruptcy Cases (pt. 1), 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 407, 460-62 (1972), but sharply criti-
cized by Lee, Leading Case Commentary, 47 AM. B.L.J. 239 (1973).
a2 CCH BANKR. L. REP. T 65,116 (1974). The court thereby overruled In re
Jones, 337 F. Supp. 620 (D. Minn. 1971), leave to appeal denied (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1040 (1972). The Eighth Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit
decision in Kokoszka, cited in note 83 supra, however, that the limitations of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act on garnishment, 15 U.S.C. § 1671, do not apply
to a tax refund. This portion is disapproved in Note, 87 H~Av. L. REv. 395, 407-10
(1973).
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Kokoszka.0 At first blush, since the refund represents prepetition
wages, it would appear clear that the trustee would be entitled to
it, or at least so much of it as would not be exempt. The difficulty
for the courts arose out of a 1970 decision of the United States
Supreme Court involving a bankrupt's vacation pay accrued but
unpaid at the time of the filing of the petition. No exemption law
applied to the pay, but the Supreme Court held, in Lines v.
Frederick,7 that the "basic purpose" of the Bankruptcy Act as
expounded in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt compelled a decision for the
bankrupt. In a per curiam opinion, the Court observed that:
The wage-earning bankrupt who must take a vacation
without pay or forgo a vacation altogether cannot be said to
have achieved the "new opportunity in life and [the] clear field
for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discourage-
"479 F.2d 990 (1973), commented on in Note, 87 HARv. L. REv. 395 (1973)
(critical); Note, 72 MicH. L. REV. 331 (1973) (approving); and 19 VILL. L. REV. 168
(1973) (approving). All three courts were in apparent agreement that if a taxpayer
authorized withholding in excess of the minimum required by law, the excess
would be property of the estate. Accord, In re Wetteroff, 453 F.2d 544 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
"1400 U.S. 18 i1973). The Lines case is criticized by Lee, Leading Case
Commentary, 45 AM. B.L.J. 115 (1971); 49 N.C.L. REV. 738 (1971). The problems
presented by accrued vacation pay are perplexing, however. Consider Judge John
Brown's concurring opinion in Kolb v. Berlin, 269 F.2d 269, 272 (5th Cir. 1966):
One might assume that the Bankruptcy Court could order the Bank-
rupt to apply for annual leave. But will his superior grant it? And if he
does, then what? Must the Bankrupt "take" this vicarious vacation-
only to see the wife and children sit idly by at home while he neither
works nor receives any pay? If he stays on the job and works to receive
the post-bankruptcy wages with which to support his family, he is not
at the same moment on annual leave. The result is that the only way
for the creditors to realize on this value is to enforce postbankruptcy
idleness without pay for the period represented by accumulated annual
leave. Required as it is in the name of law, one wonders in this twentieth
century what has happened to the Thirteenth Amendment. What has
happened to the policy behind the bankruptcy law that after discharge,
one's past economic derelictions are not to be visited on the debtor, and
that with a clear conscience, head held high, the former bankrupt can
look the world in the face? And for what length of time, what number of
years, is the Bankrupt to face this crucial alternative-no recreational
vacation or enforced idleness without pay? One year? Two years? Five
years? What happens in the meantime to his employer's-the United
States government-interest in his employment efficiency? Worse, what
happens to the bankruptcy system? Does this case remain open until such
time as the Employee-former-Bankrupt makes the hard choice? Until he
retires? Until he dies?
[Vol. 76
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ment of pre-existing debt,".., which it was the purpose of the
statute to provide.8
Mr. Justice Harlan entered a solitary dissent, suggesting that the
Court had given the matter decided inadequate attention and had
decided the case on an opaque record."9 In giving the bankrupt
vacation pay accrued before the petition, the dissenting justice
thought he obtained thereby a head start, since a fellow worker
starting on the date of the bankruptcy would not have had such
an allowance.
The district court thought in the Cedor case that:
The collection by the Internal Revenue Service, without the
consent or control of the bankrupt, and the belated refund,
render[ed] these funds quite similar in a practical sense, to the
accrued but unpaid wages which constituted vacation
pay. . . .To deprive the wage-earner of that planned-on an-
nually recurring payment, cannot be said to be less severe than
the deprivation of two weeks of paid vacation, in terms of a fresh
start. "
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, answered
that argument by saying:
Many people may come to rely upon such things as a
Christmas Club account or year-end dividends from stock own-
ership to give them a special source of income at certain times
of the year, but this does not make such items immune from a
turn-over order in bankruptcy. Permitting a bankrupt to retain
his tax refund would not be giving him a 'fresh start' to accumu-
late new wealth but a 'head start' over others who had no such
refund."
The court then took note of practicalities, which had been empha-
sized as controlling by the district court in Cedor, by acknowledg-
ing that the likely beneficiary of the refund would be the trustee
rather than the creditors as a result of its ruling. It suggested that
the district court should grant the motion of the debtor for aban-
donment of the asset
if it is reasonably clear that the assets, otherwise available for
creditors, will be entirely consumed by trustee's fees and other
"400 U.S. at 20.
"Id. at 21-22.
'1337 F. Supp. 1103, 1105 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
"1479 F.2d at 995.
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administration expenses, that no creditor has shown that there
was a likely opportunity for a trustee to recover additional as-
sets, and that the absence of a trustee will not, under the cir-
cumstances, cast a substantial additional burden on the Bank-
ruptcy Court.
2
I find the decisions in Lines, Cedor, and Gehrig hard to recon-
cile with the language of the present Bankruptcy Act," but I regard
the courts' efforts to read the words and provisions of the Act in
the light of its pervasive "fresh start" policy laudable and entirely
compatible with accepted canons of judicial construction of stat-
utes." It is hoped and believed that the constructional difficulties
would be ameliorated if not eliminated by the new Bankruptcy Act
proposed by the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States. 5 These cases illustrate the extent to which the "fresh start"
policy has become a dominant factor not only in construing the
discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Act but even in determin-
ing the scope of the property of the estate of an individual debtor
that is to be administered in bankruptcy. How far the courts have
departed from the counsel of James Monroe Olmstead in the
Harvard Law Review over seventy years ago:
While the humanitarian or relief features are meritorious,
it should be constantly borne in mind that this principle of the
law is merely an incident to its main purpose, and should not
prove a menace to the permanency of a system intended for the
perpetual benefit of merchants in general."
The distributive function of the Bankruptcy Act is by no means
"Id. at 996.
" rhese difficulties are pointed out in the critical commentary cited in notes
84, 86, and 87 supra.
'IN. DOWLING, E. PATTERSON, & R. POWELL, MATERIALS FOR LEGAL METOD C.
VII (2d ed. H. Jones 1952). Compare Lee, Leading Case Commentary, 47 AMt. B.LJ.
239, 245-46:
In Cedor the court contracted the definition of the term "property"
as used in § 70a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act and expanded the definition
of terms "garnishment" and "disposable earnings" as used in the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act. And with all that contraction and expansion
the court has gone and uprooted the yellow brick road we once traveled
to the land of the wizard to seek his assistance in parceling the kingdoms
of the wicked trustee and the unfortunate debtor. With the road gone, we
are all on our own.
"See Note, 72 MIcH. L. REv. 331, 346-48 (1973).
"Olmstead, supra note 60, at 843.
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an insignificant one, and I propose to discuss that in my second
lecture.*
*The second part of Professor Kennedy's Donley Lecture will appear in Volume
77 of the West Virginia Law Review.
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